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JURY UNANIMITY IN CALIFORNIA
The time is fast approaching, if it has not already come, when
trial by jury, like every other part of our legal fabric, will
become the subject of public criticism ....
-William Forsyth, 1852'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989 Erik and Lyle Menendez gunned down their parents in
the family's Beverly Hills mansion. Both brothers confessed to the
killings.2 Prosecutors characterized the brothers as cold-blooded
killers motivated by greed, while the defense argued that the brothers
acted in self-defense.3 Result: After separate trials for Erik and
Lyle, the jurors in each case deadlocked.4
Jurors in a 1992 Santa Clara sexual molestation case deadlocked
10-2 for conviction.' Prosecutors later learned that "one juror held
out for acquittal because he wanted evidence not even required by
law.",6 The young victim was forced to repeat her painful recollec-
tions in front of a second set of strangers. The second jury found the
defendant guilty of molestation and kidnapping.7
The recent trial of O.J. Simpson raised the specter of yet another
hung jury. Each day, millions of Americans saw a courtroom that
often seemed out of control. Attorneys on both sides openly ridiculed
and criticized each other. Jurors confronted emotionally laden and
questionably relevant issues such as domestic violence, race, discrimi-
nation, and police conspiracy.' Behind all of this confusion and legal
posturing lay the real reason why these actors were assembled:
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman were murdered and a
mountain of evidence pointed to O.J. Simpson as the killer.
1. WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 215 (New York, Cockcroft &
Co. 1878).
2. Maura Dolan, Why Jurors Err: They're Just Human, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994,
at Al, A22.
3. .k
4. Id. The Menendez brothers were retried and jurors ultimately convicted both on
two counts of first degree murder with special circumstances. People v. Menendez, No.
3A068880, 1996 WL 121110 (Cal. Super. Trans. Mar. 20, 1996).
5. Sandra Gonzales, Movement Afoot to Reform Juries: Plan Would Eliminate
Requirement of Unanimity in State Criminal Trials, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 8,
1995, at 1A.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Weighing the Necessity of Change, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at S1 [hereinafter
Necessity of Change].
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With all of these issues and subissues, the potential for a juror
hanging a hat on something unrelated to the case or outside the scope
of the law or facts seemed high. Members of the legal community
and the public braced themselves for a hung jury.' Many wondered
whether the jury could make sense of the complicated scientific
evidence and whether they would be unduly influenced by the
Fuhrman tapes,'" racial tension, or the long period of sequestra-
tion." Ironically, the Simpson case ended in a unanimous verdict,
acquitting O.J. Simpson of all charges.'2 Rather than declaring this
a triumph of the system, however, many still wondered whether the
verdict was just.'3
These California cases and other high-profile trials around the
nation involving controversial outcomes have spurred a dramatic
increase in criticism of the jury system.'4 Californians do not want
to see another criminal case end without a decision, especially where
the evidence against the defendant seems so convincing. To prevent
this outcome, some critics are attacking what they feel is one of the
keys to the jury problem: the unanimous verdict requirement.
The California Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions
that the right to a jury trial described in article I, section 16 of the
California Constitution 5 includes the right to a unanimous verdict.
16
9. Andrew Blum, A Hostile Environment For Unanimous Juries?, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
11, 1995, at Al. In-separate polls of lawyers conducted by The National Law Journal-in
September, 1994 and February, 1995-39% predicted that the jury would hang. Id.
Charles Calderon cites a poll in which 75% of those questioned believed Simpson was
guilty but only 35% thought he would actually be convicted. Charles M. Calderon, Jury
System Needs Reform, USA ToDAY, June 12, 1995, at 10A.
10. The Fuhrman tapes are a series of taped interviews between Los Angeles police
detective Mark Fuhrman and screenwriter Laura Hart McKinny in which Fuhrman boasts
about police brutality and evidence manufacturing and utters numerous racial epithets.
Jim Newton et al., Fuhrman Tapes Aired. a Recital of Racism, Wrath, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
30, 1995, at Al.
Some people feel that the controversy over the admissibility of the tapes transformed
the Simpson trial into a trial of detective Fuhrman and the Los Angeles Police
Department. Id. at A14.
11. Blum, supra note 9, at Al.
12. Jim Newton, Simpson Not Guilty: Drama Ends 474 Days After Arrest, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Newton, Not Guilty].
13. See Bill Boyarsky, D.A. Says System Needs a Shake-Up, L.A. TIMEs, May 5, 1995,
at Bi; Dolan, supra note 2, at A22 [hereinafter Boyarsky, Shake-Up] (discussing the
controversial trials of Rodney King, William Kennedy Smith, Bernhard Goetz, and others).
14. Ild.
15. The California Constitution provides that "[tlrial by jury is an inviolate right and
shall be secured to all, but in a civil cause three-fourths of the jury may render a verdict."
CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
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To eliminate the unanimity requirement, the people must propose and
vote on a constitutional amendment, and the California Supreme
Court must render some favorable decisions.'7 This process has
already begun.
In February 1995 California assemblymember Richard Rainey
drafted a proposed constitutional amendment to allow for convictions
on a 10-2 jury vote except in death penalty cases.'" California
Senate Judiciary Chairperson Charles Calderon authored another
proposed constitutional amendment. 9 Calderon's bill allows for
criminal convictions on 11-1 verdicts and, like Rainey's bill, does not
apply to death penalty cases? In early May 1995, the Assembly
Committee .on Public Safety rejected Assemblymember Rainey's
proposed amendment.2' Similarly, six of seven members of the
16. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,265, 583 P.2d 748,754,148 Cal. Rptr. 890,895
(1978); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 693, 552 P.2d 742, 745, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 785
(1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 350, 535 P.2d
373, 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 516 (1975); People v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 929, 932, 434
P.2d 623, 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329 (1967).
17. Boyarsky, Shake-Up, supra note 13, at B1.
18. Assembly Constitutional Amendment 18 would provide that "in a criminal action
in which either a felony or a misdemeanor is charged, five-sixths of the jury may render
a verdict; but if the death penalty is sought, only an unanimous jury may render the
verdict." CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, COMMiFTEE REP. FOR
ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 18, 1995-1996 Regular.Sess. Feb. 23, 1995
[hereinafter A.C.A. 18] (failed in committee). The measure would also require a
unanimous jury verdict if the parties in a misdemeanor action agreed on a jury consisting
of nine or fewer persons. Id
Rainey's proposal is supported by the California District Attorney's Association, the
Sacramento County district attorney, the Association of Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, Inc.,
the California State Sheriffs' Association, the Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau, the
California Peace Officers' Association, and the California Police Chiefs' Association. Id.
19. Senate Constitutional Amendment 24 amends the California Constitution to "allow
eleven-twelfths of the jury to render a verdict in a criminal action except in an action
where the defendant may be sentenced to the death penalty or life without parole."
CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON CRIM. PRO., COMMITTEE REP. FOR SENATE CONSTITU-
TIONAL AMENDMENT 24, 1995-1996 Regular Sess. June 27, 1995 [hereinafter S.C.A. 24]
(failed in committee).
Calderon's bill has drawn support from the California Correctional Peace Officers'
Association, the district attorneys of San Diego and Sonoma County, the chiefs of police
in Escondido and Claremont, the San Bernardino County sheriff, the Santa Ana Police
Officers' Association, and the Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau. Id
20. Id
21. Bill Ainsworth, Juror Unanimity Measure Is Blocked, RECORDER, May 10, 1995,
at 4 [hereinafter Ainsworth, Measure Blocked]. The proposed amendment failed to garner
the five votes needed to clear the eight-person Assembly Committee. Id
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Senate Criminal Procedure Committee rejected Senator Calderon's
proposal.2
Proposals to abandon the unanimity requirement have made their
way into the California legislature before, only to fail.' However,
a number of disappointing high-profile cases in recent years and the
unprecedented media coverage accompanying the Simpson trial have
inspired a larger grassroots movement supporting the amendment.24
In addition, public approval for eliminating the requirement is solid
and appears to be growing stronger.z
Citizens for a Safer California, including Fred Goldman, the
father of murder victim Ronald Goldman, led the most recent push
for change.2 6 The group was campaigning to place an initiative on
the November 1996 ballot to amend the California Constitution to
provide for nonunanimous jury verdicts of 10-2.27 Labeled the Public
Safety Protection Act of 1996, the initiative was to appear on the
ballot if supporters gathered the signatures of 693,230 registered
voters by April 10, 1996 Due to a lack of time and money,
however, backers of the initiative were forced to halt their cam-
paign.
29
22. Bill Ainsworth, Committee Favors Unanimous Juries In Criminal Cases,
RiCORDER, June 28, 1995, at 1.
23. In 1984 Los Angeles County District Attorney Robert Philibosian tried to get
nonunanimous juries approved by the state legislature and failed. See Josh Meyer,
Non-Unanimous Jury Idea Appeals to Some Reformers, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at A12
[hereinafter Meyer, Reformers].
24. Among those leading the movement are Mike Reynolds, the Fresno photographer
who led the successful "Three Strikes" initiative campaign, and the California District
Attorney's Association. Reynolds Holding, Criminal Obsession, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 5,1995,
at 1.
25. In a telephone survey of 1008 Californians, 71% of those questioned favor
abolishing the unanimity requirement. Claire Cooper, Many Favor Ending Jury
Unanimity, SACRAMENTo BEE, Sept. 12, 1995, at B1.
26. Fred Goldman Campaigns to Reform Judicial System, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995,
at B4 [hereinafter Fred Goldman]. Ronald Goldman was one of the victims involved in
the murder trial of O.J. Simpson; Simpson was ultimately acquitted of charges that he
killed Goldman. Id
27. Backers of Verdicts Proposal to Begin Seeking Signatures, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15,
1995, at A28 [hereinafter Backers]. The initiative would also repeal the Prisoner's Bill of
Rights and would eliminate conjugal visits for murderers and sex offenders. Citizens for
a Safer California: Violent Sexual Predator to Remain in Prison, PR Newswire, Dec. 14,
1995, available in WL, USNEWS Database.
28. Backers, supra note 27, at A28.
29. Supporters of Jury Initiative to Allow Convictions By 10 Members Halt Campaign,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at A23. Citizens for a Safer California has not given up its
campaign and members hope to "restart the clock by refiling the initiative with the
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California's unanimity requirement affords a protection not
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.3 ° Whereas the
Supreme Court has ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment,31 the
federally mandated jury unanimity requirement does not 2 The
holding allows states to choose whether to require unanimous ver-
dicts. Consequently, two states currently allow for a supermajority
verdict in all but capital punishment cases.
33
Since California has the power to eliminate the unanimity
requirement from its constitution, the remaining question is whether
this would be a wise decision. Proponents of the amendment point
to California's high hung jury rate, which ranges from ten to fifteen
percent of all cases tried.34 In addition, the costs of retrial can be
exorbitant? Opponents of the amendment are quick to point out
that the jury is one of the most important institutions we have in this
country, standing as a check on oppression by the state.36
This Comment will evaluate the current proposals to eliminate
the jury unanimity requirement from California criminal jury trials.
attorney general's office in the very near future." Id
30. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972).
31. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
32. The Court ruled that in federal trials, "[u]nanimity in jury verdicts is required
where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply." Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740,
748 (1948). However, the unanimity requirement does not extend to state criminal jury
trials. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 363.
33. The Oregon Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions ... in the
circuit court[,] ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save
and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a
unanimous verdict, and not otherwise." OR. CONST. art. I, § 11.
The Louisiana Constitution provides that:
A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a
jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in
which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict.
LA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17.
34. Jason L. Riley, Should a Jury Verdict Be Unanimous?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1995,
at All.
35. Id, Counties spend anywhere from $5000 to $10,000 to retry cases. Gonzales,
supra note 5, at 1A.
36. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Nixing Nonunanimous Juries, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov.
5, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Nixing]; Bruce Fein, The Unanimous Verdict Is
Essential for Fairness, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at B9. See generally Duncan, 391 U.S.
at 151-58 (discussing the history and importance of the jury trial in England and the
United States).
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Part II summarizes the origins of the unanimity requirement in the
United States, discussing its applicability on both the federal and state
levels. Part III focuses on the history of the unanimity requirement
in California. Since its passage into statehood, unanimity of verdict
has been an essential attribute of the California jury trial. Part IV
presents the arguments of both opponents. and proponents of the
proposed constitutional amendment in California. Part V evaluates
these arguments in the context of the jury system and the criminal
justice system as a whole. What is the purpose of the jury system and
will this purpose be furthered in the absence of the unanimity
requirement? Finally, in Part VI, this Author concludes that elimi-
nation of the unanimity requirement, while constitutional, threatens
the effectiveness of the California jury system and jeopardizes the
credibility of the legal system. The benefit derived from decreased
hung jury rates and cost reductions do not outweigh the risk of
convicting innocent people, damaging the process of jury deliberation,
and detrimentally minimizing the burden of proof that prosecutors
must carry to convict.
II. ORIGINS OF THE UNANIMITY REQUIREMENT
The origins of the unanimity requirement are far from certain
and various theories abound.' The first unanimous jury verdict was
recorded in 136728 In Apodaca v. Oregon39 Justice White wrote
that the requirement arose during the Middle Ages.' By the latter
half of the fourteenth century, unanimous verdicts were required in
37. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1972). Justice White, in his majority
opinion, posits four possible theories for the birth of the unanimity requirement. One
theory is that the rule was designed to compensate for lack of procedural safeguards
ensuring that the defendant received a fair trial. Id A second theory is that the rule
developed from the practice of afforcement of the jury which was firmly established by the
late 14th century. Id. This term merely meant that a sufficient number were to be added
to the panel until 12 were at last found to agree in the same conclusion. Id. Third, it is
possible that unanimity developed because "early juries, unlike juries today, personally had
knowledge of the facts of a case; the medieval mind assumed there could be only one
correct view of the facts, and, if either all the jurors or only a minority thereof declared
the facts erroneously, they might be punished for pejury." Id. Finally, unanimity may
have arisen out of the medieval concept of consent which carried with it the idea of
unanimity. Id.
38. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 179 (1994).
39. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
40. Id at 407.
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all criminal trials.4 The rule became "an accepted feature of the
common-law jury by the 18th century."'42
Early state constitutions reflected common law acceptance of the
unanimity rule. Four eighteenth-century state constitutions expressly
mandated unanimous jury. verdicts in. criminal cases,43 while others
"provided for trial by jury according to the course of the common
law."
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers provided for a right to
trial by jury in the Sixth Amendment.45 The drafters did not,
however, expressly include a unanimity requirement.46 The absence
of the requirement in the final version of the Sixth Amendment has
inspired much debate. Jury unanimity supporters maintain that the
Framers purposefully left out the rule since it was clearly "implicit in
the very concept of jury."'47 This argument rests on the historical
pedigree of the rule and the fact that at common law, when the
Constitution was adopted, most of the states required unanimous jury
verdicts in criminal cases. But the Framers' silence can also be
viewed as intending to have a substantive effect on the law.48
Clearly the Framers knew how to specify which aspects of the
41. Id, at 407 n.2.
42. Id at 408.
43. Id at 408 n.3 (citing N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. IX; PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX; VT.
CONST. of 1786, art. XI; VA. CONST. of 1776 § 8).
44. Id. For example, Maryland's constitution provided for trial by jury according to
the course of the common law while the constitutions of Delaware, Kentucky, and South
Carolina required jury trials to remain as heretofore. Id
45. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. Interestingly enough, James Madison initially introduced the Sixth Amendment
in the House of Representatives, providing for trial "by an impartial jury of freeholders
of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and
other accustomed requisites." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)
(emphasis added). Although the proposal passed the House, the Senate altered it and
then sent it back to a House conference committee. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409. The
committee ultimately adopted the Sixth Amendment as it stands in its current form. Id
47. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410.
48. Id
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common-law jury trial were to apply to the new Union.49 The
question, then, is why did they not expressly provide for a unanimity
requirement? One explanation is that Congress, knowing that four
states did not require unanimity, was unwilling to force another
affirmative duty upon those states."
A. Jury Unanimity at the Federal Level
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that jury unanimity is
one of the fundamental requirements of a federal jury trial.5 In
American Publishing Co. v. Fisher2 the Court found unanimity was
one of the essential elements of a jury trial at common law and, since
"every litigant in a common law action in the courts of the Territory
of Utah [had] the right to a trial by jury,"53 any statutory enactment
which abridged the right was unconstitutional5 4
In Thompson v. Utah55 the Court held that since the common
law required a twelve-person unanimous jury, the Sixth Amendment
included the same requirement.56 The Court relied heavily on
historical pedigree in its opinion, including references to the Magna
Carta, Nathan Hale, and Lord Bacon's Abridgment.57
In Patton v. United States58 the Court interpreted "trial by jury,"
as used in the Sixth Amendment, to be "a trial.., as understood and
applied at common law, and includes all the essential elements as they
were recognized in this country and England when the Constitution
49. The Framers were quite detailed in drafting the Sixth Amendment and it appears
that they knew exactly which elements of the common-law jury trial they wished to carry
over into the new union. Id.; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 97 (1970).
50. Jacob Tanzer, Unanimity Isn't Human Nature, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 1995, at B9.
Jacob Tanzer was the prosecutor who successfully argued that the state of Oregon was
constitutionally authorized to provide for less than unanimous jury convictions.
51. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Andres
v. United States, 333 U.S. 740,748-49 (1948); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,288-90
(1930), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); American
Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 467-68 (1897).
52. 166 U.S. 464 (1897). Fisher involved a statute which allowed for conviction upon
the vote of only nine jurors. Id. at 465.
53. Id at 468.
54. Id. at 467-68. It is interesting to note that the Fisher Court made plain that it did
not confront whether jury unanimity could be abolished by a state statute. Id.
55. 170 U.S. 343 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37 (1990).
56. Id. at 355.
57. Id. at 349-50.
58. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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was adopted."' 9 The Patton Court determined that unanimity was
one of these "essential elements."'
Finally, in Andres v. United States6 the Court held that in
criminal cases where the Sixth or Seventh Amendments apply, all
issues left to the jury must be decided unanimously.6 In Andres the
Court had to construe a federal regulation, which allowed a jury to
qualify a guilty verdict by adding the words "without capital punish-
ment."'  The lower courts issued a jury instruction requiring the jury
to unanimously qualify the verdict; otherwise the defendant would be
sentenced to death.' One of the major issues facing the Court was
whether the jury had to return a unanimous decision as to both guilt
of the defendant and qualification of the verdict. 5
The government interpreted the statute as providing that if the
jury could not unanimously qualify the verdict, the defendant's guilt
would stand and the death penalty would automatically be im-
posed.66 Petitioner argued that jury unanimity was required on all
issues relevant to the defendant's adjudication, including capital
punishment.67
The Court held that jury unanimity was required as to "all
issues-character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment-which
are left to the jury., 68 The statute was not, however, to be construed
to require a unanimous decision on qualification of the verdict.69
The Court's decision derived in a large part from "the general
humanitarian purpose of the statute and the history of the
Anglo-American jury system.
7
59. Id. at 288. The Court stated that a "trial by jury" includes the following three
elements: (1) that the jury should consist of 12 men; (2) that the trial should be in the
presence of a judge; and (3) that the verdict shall be unanimous. Id.
60. Id.
61. 333 U.S. 740 (1948).
62. Id. at 748.
63. The statute involved read as follows:
In all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder in the first
degree... the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital
punishment'; and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid,
the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Id. at 742 n.1.
64. Id. at 750-51.
65. Id. at 748-49.
66. 1&
67. I&
68. Id. at 748.
69. Id
70. Id. at 749.
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In -those cases finding that jury unanimity is constitutionally
required in federal criminal trials, the Court had relied primarily on
the historical acceptance of the rule at common law.71 While the
text of the Constitution does not expressly provide for unanimity, the
Supreme Court has construed the Sixth and Seventh Amendments,
when applicable in federal proceedings, as providing for a common-
law jury trial.72
B. Jury Unanimity at the State Level
While unanimity is clearly the rule at the federal level, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected attempts to mandatorily
impose this requirement upon the states and has left the decision up
to state legislatures and citizenry. In Maxwell v. Dow Justice
Peckham stated:
[W]hen providing in their constitution and legislation for the
manner in which civil or criminal actions shall be tried, it is
in entire conformity with the character of the Federal
Government that [the states] should have the right to decide
for themselves what shall be the form and character of the
procedure in such trials[,] ... Whether there shall be a jury
of twelve or a lesser number, and whether the verdict must
be unanimous or not.74
Twelve years later, in Jordan v. Massachusetts,5 the Court held
that "[i]n criminal cases due process of law is not denied by a state
law which dispenses with ... the necessity of a jury of twelve, or
unanimity in the verdict. 7 6 Both Maxwell and Jordan were precur-
sors to the accepted rule that the states have authority to devise their
own jury systems.
In 1972 the Supreme Court seemingly ended the debate over
whether the states were constitutionally required to provide for
unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials. TWo decisions handed
down simultaneously, upheld state constitutional provisions for less
than unanimous verdicts. Apodaca v. Oregon77 involved Oregon's
71. See, eg., Patton, 281 U.S. at 288-89; Thompson, 170 U.S. at 346-47; Fisher, 166 U.S.
at 467-68.
72. Patton, 281 U.S. at 288; Thompson, 170 U.S. at 355; Fisher, 166 U.S. at 467-68.
73. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
74. Id. at 605.
75. 225 U.S. 167 (1912).
76. Id. at 176.
77. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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constitutional provision allowing for 10-2 verdicts in all but capital
punishment cases.7" The defendant was convicted of assault,
burglary, and grand larceny on an 11-1 jury count.79 The defendant
appealed on the grounds that his conviction by less than a unanimous
verdict violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.8"
Further, the defendant argued that unanimity was essential in order
to give substance to the reasonable doubt standard mandated by the
Due Process Clause.8'
The Court rejected all of these arguments. 2 In response to the
Sixth Amendment argument, the Court held that in terms of the
underlying functions of the jury, there is "no difference between juries
required to act unanimously and those permitted to convict or acquit
by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one."'' As for the reasonable doubt
argument, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment had never been
interpreted to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases;' since the text of the Amendment itself does not provide for
a reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials, the defendant's
argument was unfounded."
On the same day it handed down Apodaca, the Court delivered
its opinion in Johnson v. Louisiana.6 In Johnson the defendant was
convicted of robbery by a 9-3 verdict, as authorized by the Louisiana
Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure for cases where the
crime is necessarily punishable by hard labor." The defendant
challenged the Louisiana Constitution and criminal statutory scheme
for jury trials, arguing that both violated his due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.8 The crux of defendant's argument
78. See supra note 33.
79. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 405-06.
80. Id. at 406.
81. Id at 411. In 1970 the Supreme Court held that guilt must be proven "beyond a
reasonable doubt" in order to secure a conviction under the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
82. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411-12.
83. Id. at 411.
84. Id
85. Id,
86. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
87. Id. at 357.
88. Id at 359. The Louisiana Constitution provided:
Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor, shall be tried by a jury of
five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases, in which the punishment
is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to
render a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by a jury of
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was identical to Apodaca's: In order to give substance to the
reasonable doubt standard, jury unanimity is required. 9
The Court rejected the defendant's arguments using virtually
identical reasoning as in Apodaca and held that conviction by a 9-3
verdict is not unconstitutional." The Court noted that it "ha[d]
never held jury unanimity to be a requisite of due process of law"
91
and that the reasonable doubt standard coexisted with Supreme Court
decisions rejecting the idea that unanimity was a requisite element of
due process?2  In addition, the Court reasoned that a verdict
rendered by nine jurors represents a "substantial majority" of the
jury, enough to overcome the doubts of the three dissenting jurists.93
The decisions in Apodaca and Johnson and the line of cases
leading up to them established the general rule that states are free to
determine the size and structure of their jury systems and may
authorize less than unanimous verdicts. As Justice Fortas noted in
Bloom v. Illinois,94
[there is] no reason whatever.., to assume that our decision
today should require us to impose federal requirements such
as unanimous verdicts or a jury of 12 upon the States. We
may well conclude that these and other features of federal
jury practice are by no means fundamental-that they are
not essential to due process of law-and that they are not
obligatory on the States.5
twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.
LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VII, § 41.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
[c]ases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a jury of twelve
jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in which punishment
is necessarily at hard labor shall be tried by a jury composed of twelve jurors,
nine of whom must concur to render a verdict.
LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 782 (amended 1974).
89. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 359.
90. Id. at 359-63.
91. Id at 359; see also Maxwell, 176 U.S. at 602 (holding that the states have the
ability to determine the manner in which state civil or criminal trials are to be tried);
Jordan, 225 U.S. at 176 (holding that "[i]n criminal cases due process of law is not denied
by a state law ... which dispenses with the necessity of a jury of twelve, or unanimity in
the verdict").
92. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 359.
93. Id. at 362 ("In our view, disagreement of three jurors does not alone establish
reasonable doubt.").
94. 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 213 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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Therefore, providing for a less than unanimous verdict will not
deprive defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury
trial.
Given that the states are free to accept or reject the unanimity
requirement, the only remaining issue facing California is whether
abolishing the rule would benefit criminal justice without eroding the
historical protections traditionally interposed between the defendant
and the government.
III. HISTORY OF THE UNANIMITY REQUIREMENT IN CALIFORNIA
A. Common-Law Origins of California's
Unanimity Requirement
The unanimity requirement has been a necessary component of
California jury trials since California's passage into statehood in 1850.
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, which provides for
the right to a jury trial, has been interpreted as extending the right as
it had existed at common law, prior to the adoption of the California
Constitution. 6 At common law, verdict unanimity was one of the
essential attributes of the jury trial and, upon passage of the Califor-
nia Constitution, the unanimity requirement became a part of
California criminal procedure.
While the California Constitution does not expressly provide for
a "common law" jury trial, the Framers, as well as the citizens who
voted to adopt the Constitution, intended that jury trials be provided
as they had been at English common law.97 In the course of
discussing the California Constitution's jury trial provision, the Powell
court noted:
[The Constitution's] framers were, with few exceptions, from
states where the common law prevails, and where the
language used has a well-defined meaning. The people who,
by their votes, adopted the constitution, at least a vast
majority of them, were also from countries where the
common law is in force, and they looked upon the right
96. See infra notes 97-124 and accompanying text.
97. People v. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 354-55, 25 P. 481, 483 (1891). The Powell court
noted that the California Constitution does not define the right to a jury trial. Rather, "[ilt
was a right then existing, the extent, scope, and limitations of which were well understood,
and the constitution simply provides that such right shall be secured, and remain
inviolate." Id at 355, 25 P. at 483.
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secured as the right there known and there held inviolate.
It is in this common-law sense that the language has always
been regarded by the courts of this state.9"
The California Constitution provides that "[t]rial by jury is an
inviolate right and shall be secured to all."99 This fundamental right
to a jury trial applies in all actions, both civil and criminal, which were
recognizable at common law prior to the adoption of the constitu-
tion."° While the legislature may "establish reasonable regulations
or conditions on the enjoyment of the right,"' 0'1 it must ensure
preservation of the essential elements of a jury trial."l Any legisla-
tive action that abridges the right is unconstitutional and void. 3
Although the California Constitution does not expressly define
the "essential elements" of a jury trial, it is well established that the
type of jury trial guaranteed by the California Constitution is that
which existed at common law in 1850, when the state Constitution was
adopted. °4
The provision of our Bill of Rights that the right of trial by
jury is to remain inviolate means that all the substantial
incidents and consequences which pertain to the right of trial
by jury at common law are beyond the reach of hostile
98. Id. at 356, 25 P. at 483.84.
99. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
100. Exparte Liggett, 187 Cal. 428,430,202 P. 660, 661 (1921); Cline v. Superior Court,
184 Cal. 331, 339, 193 P. 929, 932 (1920); Tibbitts v. Fife, 162 Cal. App. 2d 568, 571, 328
P.2d 212,214 (1958); Sonleitner v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 2d 258,259,322 P.2d 496,
497 (1958); Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 128, 302 P.2d 397, 400 (1956).
However, the right to trial by jury should not be narrowly construed. "It is not
limited strictly to those cases in which it existed before the adoption of the Constitution
but is extended to cases of like nature as may afterwards arise." People v. One 1941
Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 300, 231 P.2d 832, 844 (1951) (emphasis added).
101. People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 692, 552 P.2d 742, 745, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 785
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077 (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id.; Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d at 287, 231 P.2d at 835; People v. Kelly, 203 Cal.
128,133,263 P. 226,228 (1928); People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404,408,32 P,2d 433,
435-36 (1934); Peete v. Peete, 54 Cal. App. 333, 363-64, 202 P. 51, 65 (1921).
104. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d at 692,552 P.2d at 745,131 Cal. Rptr. at 785; Chevrolet Coupe,
37 Cal. 2d at 286-87, 231 P.2d at 835; Kelly, 203 Cal. at 133, 263 P. at 228; Cline, 184 Cal.
at 339, 193 P.2d at 932; Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 293, 168 P. 135, 136-37
(1917); People v. Oliver, 196 Cal. App. 3d 423, 429, 241 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (1978).
The phrase "common law" refers to the whole body of English common law, as
influenced by statute, which existed at the time the California Constitution was adopted.
Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d at 287, 231 P.2d at 835; Martin, 176 Cal. at 293, 168 P. at 136;
Richardson, 138 Cal. App. at 408, 32 P.2d at 435.
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legislation and are preserved in their ancient, substantial
extent as they existed at common law. 5
At that time, the common-law jury included three essential ele-
ments:1 6  number of jurors, impartiality of jurors,"~ and una-
nimity of verdict."°
The unanimity requirement, then, is a product of English
common law, carried over into California law with the adoption of the
California Constitution. In People v. Superior Court" the Califor-
nia Supreme Court authoritatively held that "[t]he Constitution
guarantees the fundamental right to a unanimous verdict" and that
each juror must reach their own independent judgment in the
verdict."' In that case the trial court declared a mistrial upon
discovering that one of twelve jurors in a murder trial had not
reached his own decision in the verdict to convict."' According to
the juror, he "went with the majority.' ' " The trial court immedi-
ately declared a mistrial and the Supreme Court affirmed on the
ground that "[a]cquiescence simply because the verdict has been
reached by the majority is not an independent judgment, and if
permitted, would undermine the right to a unanimous verdict.""
4
Subsequent California Supreme Court decisions reconfirm the
unanimity requirement's vitality and continued necessity in California
jury trials. In People v. Feagley"5 the court declared unconstitution-
105. Peete, 54 Cal. App. at 363-64, 202 P. at 65.
106. The three essential elements are number, impartiality, and unanimity. Richardson,
138 Cal. App. at 408-09, 32 P.2d at 436; Peete, 54 Cal. App. at 366, 202 P. at 66.
107. The required number of jurors for both civil and criminal trials can be found in
article 1, § 16 of the California Constitution. See Collins, 17 Cal. 3d at 693, 552 P.2d at
746, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 786 ("The elements of number and unanimity combine to form an
essential element of unity in the verdict.").
108. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,265, 583 P,2d 748, 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
895 (1978) ("Section 16 of article 1 does not explicitly guarantee trial by an 'impartial' jury,
as does the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution; but that right is no less
implicitly guaranteed by our charter, as the courts have long recognized."); People v.
Galloway, 202 Cal. 81, 93, 259 P. 332, 337 (1927) (holding that defendant's constitutional
right to a jury trial was violated when juror failed to reveal a prejudice toward the
defendant).
109. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d at 693,552 P.2d at 745,131 Cal. Rptr. at 785; People v. Superior
Court, 67 Cal. 2d 929, 932, 434 P.2d 623, 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329 (1967).
110. 67 Cal. 2d 929, 434 P.2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1967).
111. Id at 932, 434 P.2d at 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
112. Id. at 931, 434 P.2d at 624, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
113. Id
114. Id. at 932, 434 P.2d at 625, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
115. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
April 1996] 1335
1336 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1319
al-on equal protection grounds-a "mentally disordered sex
offenders" law which permitted commitment on a three-fourths jury
verdict."6 Another California statute, the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act (LPS)," 7 provided for the commitment of an individual on the
ground that he or she is an "imminently dangerous person" only upon
a unanimous jury verdict."' The court reasoned that since the right
to a unanimous verdict is fundamental, the state had to put forward
a compelling interest justifying "[the] distinction between the rights of
mentally disordered sex offenders and those of persons committed
under the LPS Act, and that the distinction is necessary to further
such purpose.""' 9  Finding no such compelling state interest, the
court found the law unconstitutional) 2
The court in People v. Collins2' reiterated the basic principle
that unanimity is required in jury verdicts and additionally provided
that "[t]he requirement that 12 persons reach a unanimous verdict is
not met unless those 12 reach their consensus through deliberations
which are the common experience of all of them."1' 1 Two years
later the court in People v. Wheeler,"z' citing both Peagley and
People v. Superior Court, held that "[i]t is settled that in criminal
cases the right [to a jury trial] includes in this state the right to a
unanimous verdict" and the verdict must be rendered by impartial and
unprejudiced jurors."
Since its passage into statehood and its adoption of the constitu-
tion, California has provided for jury trials as they existed at common
law in 1850. Unanimity of verdict was required in 1850 and continues
as a requirement today.
B. Prior Attacks on the Unanimity Requirement
Current efforts to amend the California Constitution do not
represent the first attack on the state's unanimity requirement. In the
early 1980s the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected a proposed
116. Id. at 358, 535 P.2d at 386, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
117. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5599 (West 1969 & Supp. 1996).
118. Id. § 5303.
119. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d at 356, 535 P.2d at 384, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
120. Id. at 358, 535 P.2d at 386, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
121. 17 Cal. 3d 687, 552 P.2d 742, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1976).
122. It. at 693, 552 P.2d at 746, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
123. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
124. Id. at 265, 583 P.2d at 754, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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constitutional amendment, and a state initiative came very close to
reaching the November 1984 ballot." 5
The Senate measure would have allowed for jury decisions on 10-
2 or 11-1 votes in criminal cases not involving the death penalty.'2
Authored by former California Senator Robert Presley (D-Riverside)
and sponsored by former Los Angeles County District Attorney
Robert Philibosian, the Senate Judiciary Committee "soundly
rejected" the measure by a 2-6 vote.2 Opponents of the measure
argued that the amendment, if passed, would "lead to less jury
deliberation ... and [would] undermine public confidence in the
strength of the justice system." m
In addition to the Senate proposal, Philibosian, joined by Los
Angeles Sheriff Sherman Block and former State Attorney General
Evelle Younger, played a key role in the movement to place the
"Speedy Trial Initiative" on the November 1984 ballot.29 The pro-
posed court reform initiative would have allowed for 10-2 or 11-1
acquittals or convictions along with a number of other changes in the
criminal justice system. 3 '
The Speedy Trial Initiative failed to qualify for the November
1984 ballot.'3 ' Backers came up 30,000 to 80,000 signatures short of
the required 630,136.3 Proponents of the initiative attributed the
measure's failure to a lawsuit brought by the League of Womens'
Voters and former O.J. Simpson defense lawyer Gerald Uelman.' 3'
The lawsuit alleged that Philibosian, Block, and others used county
125. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
126. UPI, Sept. 22, 1983, AM Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
127. UPI, Jan. 24, 1984, AM Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
128. Id.
129. UPI, Feb. 11, 1984, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
130. In addition to allowing nonunanimous jury verdicts, the initiative provided that
court proceedings could be delayed only for "just cause" and that judges rather than
lawyers would conduct questioning in jury selection. UPI, Sept. 22, 1983, AM Cycle,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Furthermore, the initiative proposed to
streamline procedures in preliminary proceedings and dismiss cases in which more than six
but fewer than ten jurors favored acquittal. Id.
131. UPI, Feb. 11, 1984, BC Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
132. Id.
133. Ronald K.L. Collins, Government by Popular Initiative: States Amend Their
Constitutions, NAT'L L.., June 18, 1984, at 14,34. Prior to the suit initiated by the League
of Women Voters, former Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. filed suit against Philibosian,
Block, and 15 other county officials, alleging violations of the Ralph Brown Act, which
prohibits private meetings concerning public business. UPI, Apr. 4, 1983, AM Cycle,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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funds and resources to discuss, draft, and provide support for the
initiative in violation of the Political Reform Act."4
Despite the failure of the Senate measure and the public
initiative, both efforts demonstrate that, opposition to the unanimity
requirement in California has historical roots and that given the right
political setting, constitutional change may become a reality.
IV. PRESENTING THE ARGUMENTS: UNANIMITY VS. THE
NONUNANIMOUS VERDICT
The proposed constitutional amendments have drawn their share
of criticism from both sides of the unanimity debate. While it is
difficult to determine the relative merit of any one argument, taken
as a whole, the positions advanced by both supporters and opponents
of the proposals are persuasive. The attraction of both sides stems
from a common goal: maintaining the integrity of the judicial
system."5
Clearly the jury system has rendered some controversial decisions
over the past few years, causing public confidence in criminal justice
to waver.'36 The initial reaction to these decisions has been to look
at the system and ask why it is producing such questionable results.
While almost everyone agrees that the system could use some
improvement, not everyone agrees on the more difficult question of
how to effect this improvement.
However difficult -the issue, though, use of the constitutional
amendment process should be reserved for only the most pressing and
necessary changes. 37 Lawmakers must have a firm grasp of the
issues and potential ramifications of the proposed change when they
cast their votes. 38  Voters, too, may face the unanimity question;
they have a responsibility to sift through the arguments and determine
134. League of Women Voters v. Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Comm.,
203 Cal. App. 3d 529, 250 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1988).
135. Unanimity proponents believe that preservation of the requirement assures the
public that the jury is truly deliberating and that justice is being served. See, e.g., Fein,
supra note 36, at B9. However, opponents feel that elimination of the requirement will
restore the public's lost confidence in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Calderon, supra
note 9, at 10A.
136. Cathleen Decker, Faith in Justice System Drops, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1995, at 52
("[Plublic perception of the courts [has] ... been tarnished by the host of controversial
trials that have occurred here in recent years.").
137. Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3 (arguing that "changing the state
Constitution after 150 years surely should require a showing of a substantial problem").
138. Id
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for themselves whether California really needs to change its constitu-
tion, a document which has been in place for nearly 150 years.
The following presents a brief summary of the key issues
comprising both sides of the unanimity debate.
A. Arguments in Favor of Nonunanimous Verdicts
1. History does not mandate continued acceptance
of the unanimity rule
One of the primary arguments against the proposed constitutional
amendments is that they will eliminate a defining requirement of
California's criminal jury trials, which has commanded support for
over 700. years, dating back to the common law.'39 In effect the
rule's "historical pedigree" justifies its continued acceptance. As
noted by Jeffrey Abramson,
[flor over six hundred years, the unanimous verdict has
stood as a distinctive and defining feature of jury trials. The
first recorded instance of a unanimous verdict occurred in
1367; when an English Court refused to accept an 11-1 guilty
vote after the lone holdout stated he would rather die in
prison than consent to convict."4
In his dissent in Johnson v. Louisiana,4' Justice Douglas stated
that "[t]he unanimous jury has been so embedded in our legal history
that no one would question its constitutional position."'' Douglas
is not alone in this presumption of constitutionality. William
Blackstone wrote that conviction of the accused should be "confirmed
by the unanimous suffrage of 12 of his equals" and that this require-
ment should remain "sacred and inviolate."'4 Justice Story also
believed that unanimity was an essential constitutional guarantee,
reasoning that "[a] trial by jury is generally understood to mean...
a trial by a jury of twelve [men], impartially selected, who must
unanimously concur in the guilt of the accused before a legal
139. Id.
140. ABRAMSON, supra note 38, at 179.
141. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
142. Id. at 382 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
143. Bill Boyarsky, Balky Trial Could Ignite Move to Radically Alter Jury System, L.A.
TIMES, April 25, 1995, at A18 [hereinafter Boyarsky, Balky Trial] (citing WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES (1769)).
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conviction can be had. Any law, therefore, dispensing with any of
these requisites, may be considered unconstitutional."'"
While historical acceptance lends credibility to the unanimity
requirement, this type of justification begs the question of why we
should continue to adhere to the rule today. Is it enough to say that
since the rule is deeply rooted in history it should remain so today?
Or is this blind faith?
a. historical inertia is no justification for continued
adherence to the unanimity rule
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected historical construc-
tions of constitutional amendments wherein the proponent merely
points to the existence of a practice or procedure at common law and
then argues that acceptance then requires acceptance now. In
Hurtado v. California45 Justice Harlan argued in dissent that to
apply a sterile historical approach to constitutional construction
"would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render
it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon
our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the
Medes and Persians. ' 146
The authors of the proposed constitutional amendments agree
that historical inertia should not prevent change.'47 In support of
their movement for change, proponents of the nonunanimous verdict
place great emphasis on the fact that England, the historical
benchmark for the unanimity requirement, no longer requires
unanimous verdicts.' 4
Beyond England, nonunanimous verdicts are the rule in
Scotland,'49 Australia," ° and Norway.. as well as in Oregon and
144. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 559 n.2 (5th ed. 1891).
145. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
146. l at 529 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
147. E.g., A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 3.
148. ld.; Bill Boyarsky, Unanimous Verdicts Also On Trial, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1995,
at Al [hereinafter Boyarsky, On Trial]; Tanzer, supra note 50, at B9. England eliminated
the unanimity requirement by statute in 1967. Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80, § 13
(Eng.) (repealed 1974). For the text of the current English statute providing for majority
verdicts, see Juries Act, 1974, ch. 23, § 17 (Eng.).
149. FORSYTH, supra note 1, at 279-80.
150. Tanzer, supra note 50, at B9.
151. In Norway, juries are composed of ten members, seven of whom must agree for
a conviction. Bill McClellan, TELLING NORWEGIANS ABOUT O.J. ISN'T EASY, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1994, at Al.
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Louisiana here in the United States.' Simply stated, the unanimity
requirement has lost its historical sanctity in the United States,
England, and abroad, and it is no longer presumed that a constitution-
al state jury trial must include the right to a unanimous verdict.
However, Supreme Court decisions affirming a state's right to
provide for a nonunanimous jury verdict do not stand for the
proposition that nonunanimous verdicts are the best or even the most
efficient means of pursuing criminal justice. Constitutionality is
not conclusive proof of sufficiency or wisdom. Each state must still
individually determine whether elimination of the rule is a necessary
step or an unnecessary evil."M
b. the unanimity requirement is a historical accident
Another argument countering the historical pedigree justification
is that like the twelve-person jury requirement, unanimity is nothing
more than a historical accident. 5  According to Patrick Devlin, the
answer to the question of the origin of the unanimity requirement is
that "no one ever planned that it should be that way; the rule is
simply an antique."'5 6 Many historians agree that the evolution of
the requirement was by chance. 7
If the unanimity requirement is merely a historical accident, this
militates against placing so much importance in the rule. 5 United
States constitutional law should be based on solid principles which
have been forged at the anvil of time and adapted to the changing
environment. 9 Rules that are the product of historical flukes are
no match for the sound and reasoned judgment of the states.
152. See supra note 33 for the text of the Oregon and Louisiana constitutions.
153. For a general discussion of the unanimity requirement by the Supreme Court, see
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
154. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 372-73; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 213, reh'g denied,
392 U.S. 947 (1968); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900).
155. State v. Gann, 463 P.2d 570, 573 (Or. 1969).
156. PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 48 (1956).
157. Gann, 463 P.2d at 573.
158. Id.
159. See Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3.
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c. continued acceptance of the unanimity requirement
freezes the law in time
Finally, supporters of nonunanimous verdicts attack the historical
pedigree justification by arguing that the approach effectively freezes
the law in time." If we base our acceptance of the twelve person,
unanimous jury requirement on the fact that this was the English
practice adopted in the American colonies, arguably a host of other
practices should be admitted under the same rationale.1 6' Some of
these practices do not fit comfortably within our current scheme of
democracy, but the historical argument mandates their inclusion. The
court in State v. Gann pointed out that "[i]n England, in the colonies,
and in many of the states, a jury was required to be composed only
of white male property owners."' 62 Using the historical pedigree
approach, we would be required to provide for juries composed of
white, male property owners." While this is an extreme case, it
demonstrates the weakness of this form of constitutional construction.
2. Adoption of the nonunanimous jury requirement would
effectively reduce the number of hung juries in California
One of the primary motivations of the proposed constitutional
amendments is to end the increasing number of hung juries that
allegedly plagues the criminal justice system in California."6 Not
only do hung juries tax the economic and judicial resources of
California,'1  but they potentially threaten the integrity of the
criminal justice system in the eyes of the public.11
160. See id.; Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528-29 (rejecting the argument that any proceeding
which "has the sanction of settled usage both in England and in [the United States]"
necessarily represents due process of law).
161. Gann, 463 P.2d at 575.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 2; S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3.
165. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3; Bill Ainsworth, And Then There Were Ten,
RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1995, at 1 [hereinafter Ainsworth, Ten].
166. Calderon, supra note 9, at 10A ("Bizarre jury verdicts in recent high-profile cases
have shaken the public's confidence in our jury system."); Laura Mecoy, Drive For Legal
Reforms To Follow Simpson Trial, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 4, 1995, at Al; Meyer,
Reformers, supra note 23, at A12 ("One more high-profile trial torpedoed by a holdout
juror or two... and a 'crisis in credibility' in the judicial system may prompt calls for an
overhaul." (quoting L.A. County District Attorney Gil Garcetti)).
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California Senator Charles Calderon, in his proposed amendment,
cites as one of the bill's goals "increas[ing] the number of convictions
and acquittals by decreasing the rate of hung juries."' 67 Assembly-
member Rainey's bill aims to "reduce court costs and court conges-
tion due to retrials and speed up the trial process."'"
The hung jury rate for California criminal trials presently hovers
between ten to fifteen percent of all criminal jury trials.6 9 Even
more striking are the figures for hung jury rates by county. In 1994
Los Angeles County's hung jury rate was fourteen percent while
Alameda County's was fifteen percent and Ventura County's was
eight percent. 70
While these figures are troubling in their own right, the argument
for abandoning the requirement gains even more credibility when
California's numbers are compared to national percentages and, more
importantly, to hung jury rates in states which do not provide for a
unanimous verdict requirement in criminal trials.
Currently, about 2.5% percent of juries hang each year in federal
criminal cases, and about five percent hang in state courts nation-
wide.' Accordingly, California's hung jury rate is approximately
four times the nationwide federal court percentage, roughly double
the nationwide state court percentage.
For the purposes of evaluating the proposed constitutional
amendments it is much more helpful to compare California's hung
jury rate with the hung jury rates in majority verdict states and to
examine studies analyzing primary and final jury ballots in terms of
their relationship to final verdicts and hung juries.'7 From this type
of inquiry, one can estimate the effectiveness of eliminating the
unanimity requirement in reducing hung jury rates.
As noted earlier, only Oregon and Louisiana do not require
unanimity. 3  Oregon has allowed for 10-2 verdicts in all felony
criminal cases except first-degree murder since 1934.' Like the
167. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3.
168. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 3.
169. Riley, supra note 34, at All.
170. Dwayne Bray, Prosecutors Seek a Change in Jury-Voting System, L.A. TIMES
(Ventura County ed.), June 11, 1995, at Bi, B8; see Dolan, supra note 2, at Al.
171. Necessity of Change, supra note 8, at S4.
172. See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text (discussing Kalven & Zeisel study
on majority versus unanimous verdicts).
173. For a look at the relevant constitutional provisions from both states, see supra note
33.
174. Blum, supra note 9, at Al, A24.
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current proposed amendments in California, Oregon's rejection of the
unanimity requirement was based on the "frequent occurrence" of
hung juries resulting from "one or two jurors ... controlling the
verdict or causing a disagreement."'7 The change has apparently
worked wonders: From 1993 to 1995, the statewide hung jury rate has
been less than one percent.76
Louisiana has also experienced a positive return from its
elimination of the unanimous verdict requirement. Louisiana first
authorized nonunanimous juries in 1928."r While statewide statis-
tics are not available, one judge estimated that between 1993 and
1995, the hung jury rate in his court was approximately two-and-a-half
percent.'78
In perhaps the only extensive study conducted on the frequency
of hung juries in states with and without the unanimity requirement
(the Chicago study), University of Chicago professors Harry Kalven
and Hans Zeisel found that in states requiring unanimity, the average
frequency of hung juries was 5.6%, while in states without the
requirement, the rate was 3.1%.17' Based on these findings, "[t]he
jurisdictions that allow majority verdicts have ... 45 percent fewer
hung juries than those that require unanimity."'" °
In addition to comparing jurisdictions with and without the
unanimity requirement, the Chicago study also took a sample of forty-
eight cases hung and examined the final vote of the jurors before
deliberations ended. In twenty-four percent of the cases, the jury
hung on an 11-1 vote for conviction, while in ten percent of cases, the
jury hung on a 10-2 count. 8' On the other end of the spectrum, in
eight percent of the cases, the jury hung 10-2 to acquit." If the
175. Id
176. Id.
177. Id
178. Id
179. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 461 (1966). The
findings were based on extrapolations of numbers from New York City, New Jersey, Los
Angeles, and North Dakota in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Blum, supra note 9, at A24.
In 1963 in New York there were 7 hung juries per 100 trials that went to verdict, while in
Los Angeles there were 15 hung juries per 100 trials. Id The numbers, blended with
judges' estimates of hung jury rates, produced the 5.6% national average. Id.
The Kalven & Zeisel study has been cited on numerous occasions and was even used
by the majority in Apodaca v. Oregon, where the Court upheld Oregon's nonunanimous
verdict rule. 406 U.S. 404, 411 n.5 (1972).
180. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 179, at 461.
181. Id at 460.
182. Id
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Rainey bill were in place for all forty-eight of these trials, a reduction
of hung jury cases would amount to forty-two percent.113 The
Calderon bill would have achieved a twenty-four percent reduction in
hung jury trials."8
To better understand the significance of the hung jury problem
and, simultaneously, to better appreciate the arguments of the
nonunanimous verdict supporters, one must explore the causes of
hung juries as well as the benefits which may inure from eliminating
the unanimity rule. It is one thing to say California has a problem
with hung juries and that a constitutional amendment may help solve
the problem, but it is quite another to explain why hung juries burden
the system and how the unanimity requirement perpetuates this
problem. The following sections address these subjects.
a. the hung jury as a product of the unanimity rule
The jury system operates under the assumption that twelve of the
defendant's peers will assemble to hear the charges against the
defendant and will then deliberate until they reach a decision shared
by all."8 As Jerome Skolnick describes, "we assume that a jury of
12 ordinary citizens, whatever their racial or ethnic backgrounds, will
review and assess evidence from a commonality of moral assumptions
and social bonds.',
18 6
What opponents of the unanimous verdict requirement contend,
however, is that "[p]erfect unanimity is simply not consistent with
human nature. Seldom do 12 people hold the same opinion, parti-
cularly on grave matters."' ' To make matters worse, these oppo-
nents argue, oftentimes the jury will hang because of one or two
jurors who, for invalid reasons, refuse to join the majority opin-
ion.I88
183. The Rainey proposal would permit 10-2 jury verdicts. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18,
at 1.
184. The Calderon proposal would permit 11-1 jury verdicts. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19,
at 3.
185. Jerome H. Skolnick, O.J. TriaL" The System Against Itself, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27,
1995, at A37. Jerome Skolnick is a professor of law and police science at the John Jay
School of Criminal Justice in New York. ld.
186. Id
187. Tanzer, supra note 50, at B9.
188. Id.; see Alan Hirsch, The Jury Is Way Out, WASH. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1995, at A23;
Meyer, Reformers, supra note 23, at A12; Henry Weinstein & Tim Rutten, Simpson Case
Already Is Rewriting the Rule Book, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at Al, A34.
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California Assemblymember Richard Rainey contends that a con-
stitutional amendment will "stop the effect of a one or two person
veto of the jury process, which is often an expression of dislike or bias
against the criminal justice system as opposed to a decision on the law
or evidence in a given case."'89 A defender of the Oregon system
noted that "[t]he beauty of our system is that it [keeps] the one
crackpot, the one person that will never see things the way others do,
from holding up the entire system.' 190 Finally, a Kern County dis-
trict attorney feels that change is necessary in California because of
the so-called flake factor: "Put any 12 Californians in a room and
you'll have [at least] one flake."' 9'
Assuming that these lawmakers and critics of the rule are correct,
the unanimity requirement plays a direct role in California's hung jury
problem. If one or two jurors can define the entire jury, then perhaps
the constitution should be amended to compensate for these
completely divergent views.
To better understand how the unanimity rule perpetuates hung
juries, it may be helpful to examine the potential reasons why juries
hang in the first place. Of these alleged reasons, two stand out as
particularly frustrating to proponents of a constitutional amendment:
First, one or two stubborn jurors may decide to challenge the
majority, oftentimes resting their case on inadmissible evidence or
misinterpretations of the law;" and second, defense attorneys often
approach the jury with the intention of hanging it from the begin-
ning. 3 If juries hang because jurors are not performing their ap-
propriate role or defense attorneys are intentionally manipulating the
jury pool in order to get a favorable decision, then the argument for
abolishing the unanimity requirement must be addressed.
189. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 3.
190. Meyer, Reformers, supra note 23, at A12.
191. Weinstein & Rutten, supra note 188, at A34.
192. Blum, supra note 9, at 1; The O.J. Trial Anomaly, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 6,
1995, at B6 [hereinafter Anomaly].
193. Gonzales, supra note 5, at 1A (" 'Oftentimes, defense attorneys approach these
trials seeking to hang cases, not necessarily seeking acquittals.'" (quoting Gregory Totten,
executive director of the California District Attorney's Association)); Tanzer, supra note
50, at B9 (stating that "the strategy of many defense lawyers ... is often not to seek an
acquittal, but to hang the jury by choosing at least one juror with the temperament to hold
out against the others and to convince this juror to do so").
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i. hung juries result when one or two jurors
refuse to join the majority
Whether or not holdout jurors are "crackpots," "screwballs," or
"flakes" is not really the issue. For whatever reason, jurors some-
times reach results that seem inconsistent with the evidence presented
or the rules of law.'" There are many reasons posited for why
jurors reach questionable results. The most basic argument is that
human nature contradicts twelve minds agreeing on one issue. 9 No
matter how good or bad the case against the defendant is, the
assumption that a commonality of views will arise is naive and
speculative. 96 The chances of unanimity are even less likely when
a highly charged issue of morality is involved." In every murder
case jurors confront the possibility of incarcerating a defendant for life
or possibly sentencing the defendant to death. Some individuals
facing this decision may succumb to sentiment or even a guilty con-
science. 9
Instead of adjudicating the defendant's guilt or innocence on the
basis of the facts of the case and the relevant rules of evidence, jurors
may decide to use their vote to effect some other purpose.'99
Unanimity opponents point to countless numbers of cases in which
jurors confessed afterwards to casting their votes on some inappropri-
ate basis?' In the trial of a Westlake mother charged with child
abuse for allegedly disciplining her daughter by biting her and
194. See Blum, supra note 9, at 1; Gonzales, supra note 5, at 1A.
195. Tanzer, supra note 50, at B9.
196. Id.
197. Id
198. See Ainsworth, Ten, supra note 165, at 1 (" 'What we're trying to avoid are cases
with absolutely compelling evidence where a juror didn't have the intestinal fortitude to
convict.'" (quoting Mike Reynolds, sponsor of the "Three Strikes" law in California));
Kay Daut Alvarez, Change the Verdict System, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 21, 1994,
at 1 (discussing the Menendez jurors' emotional verdicts).
199. Few will forget Johnny Cochran's closing argument in the Simpson case imploring
the jury to acquit O.J. Simpson and send a message to the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment. Jim Newton & Andrea Ford, Acquit Simpson and Send Police a Message, Cochran
Urges Jury, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at Al. Cochran instructed the jury that its verdict
"[would] go far beyond the walls of [the courtroom]" and that the verdict "talks about the
police and whether they're above the law." Id.; see also Alvarez, supra note 198, at 1
(arguing that "[i]f California adopted a 10-out-of-12 ruling, we could blunt the effectiveness
of recalcitrant individuals who promote their private agendas").
200. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 5-7 (discussing the Santa Clara kidnapping
case where the lone holdout juror failed to convict based on evidence which was not even
admissible).
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imprisoning her in a racquetball court, the jury hung 11-1.1' The
one juror who voted for acquittal told the other jurors that "he empa-
thized with the defendant because he had raised an unruly daughter
of his own."'  Arguably, this rationale is not an appropriate basis
on which a juror should rest a decision.
Much discussion has surrounded the idea of jury nullification.'
Although the scope of this Comment does not permit a detailed
analysis, it is important to realize that jurors can and sometimes do
disregard the law and render opinions based upon their own sense of
justice. As the court noted in United States v. Dougherty,2 4 "[t]he
pages of history shine on instances of the jury's exercise of its
prerogative to disregard ... [the] instructions of the judge."2 5
Furthermore, the court noted that "[t]he jury gets its understanding
... [of] the legal system from more than one voice. There is the
formal communication from the judge. There is the informal commu-
nication from the total culture ... and, of course, history and
tradition.,,6
In addition to jurors simply voting their consciences without
following the established rules of evidence or substantive law,
opponents of unanimity feel that many procedural features of the jury
system contribute to questionable results.' Elhiuination of the rule,
the argument runs, would simply compensate.for the occasional juror
who, for procedural reasons, arrives at a faulty decision."
During the course of a trial, most courts forbid jurors to ask
questions, take notes, or see transcripts of prior testimony.2 0° Jurors
are the factfinders in a legal proceeding. Procedural rules which
prevent them from assimilating an adequate picture of the facts serve
201. Bray, supra note 170, at B1.
202. Id.
203. Jury nullification is a practice in which jurors choose to disregard a written rule
of law because they do not agree that the law comports with traditional notions of justice.
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Franklin Strier, Justice
by Jury Is a Myth, L.A. TIMEs, July 18, 1994, at B7 (stating that "the power of jurors to
ignore the law is inviolable, defended by pillars of the bench and bar alike").
204. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
205. Id. at 1130.
206. Id. at 1135.
207. See Josh Meyer, Small Vanguard Presses Its Case for Jury Reforms, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1994, at Al, A12 [hereinafter Meyer, Vanguard]; Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
208. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 3.
209. Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
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to cripple the process."' Decisions should be informed, and rules
which handicap the jury may potentially cause one or two individual
jurors to reach a questionable result.2 '
Arcane judicial instructions that many jurors cannot understand
or apply are another procedural handicap threatening the results of
jury trials.' Confusing legalese, convoluted sentence structure, and
indefinite standards combine to potentially confuse the jury and
confound the results." Assuming that some jurors do not compre-
hend instructions, decisions that hang by one or two votes may be the
product of the confusing rules rather than a sign that the defendant's
guilt or innocence was clear.214
Clearly, the jury system does not always perform as intended and
these are exactly the cases that proponents of the proposed constitu-
tional amendments are trying to combat.215  As will be discussed
later, however, this phenomenon may not pose as much of a problem
as critics of the jury system think.
ii. hung juries as a result of defense counsel tactics
Defense attorneys who exercise an array of clever tactics to
manipulate jurors and influence their decision-making process provide
another source of questionable jury results.1 6 Some lawyers are
skilled at playing upon the emotions of the lay juror.1 7 Appeals to
sympathy, victim-blaming, and moral posturing are all defense
210. 1d; Hirsch, supra note 188, at A23.
211. Meyer, Vanguard, supra note 207, at A12.
212. Dolan, supra note 2, at Al ("Jurors have trouble understanding judges who give
convoluted instructions."); Strier, supra note 203, at B7 ("[T]he judge's instructions usually
confound the jurors with jargon-laden, incomprehensible language-worded to avoid
appellate reversal, not to guide jurors.").
For a general discussion of the problems surrounding jurors' comprehension of the
law and application of judicial instructions, see Christopher N. May, "What Do We Do
Now?": Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 869 (1995).
213. See Pressure Grows to Reform Juries, ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 14, 1995, at A2;
Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
214. Meyer, Vanguard, supra note 207, at A12 ("[S]tudies and some experts argue, an
alarming number of jurors do not comprehend the stupefying amount of evidence and the
convoluted jury instructions thrown at them in many complex trials. Sometimes they come
down on the wrong side of the law.").
215. A.C.A. 18, supra notd 18, at 3; S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3.
216. Strier, supra note 203, at B7 ("For years, crafty attorneys have prevailed ... by
plying myriad forensic tricks and pandering to the basest of juror emotions.").
217. Id.
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attorney tools. 18 Lawyers may also focus on societal stereotypes
steeped in racism,2 19 sexism,20 and homophobia.11
The most disturbing defense attorney practice is intentionally
attempting to hang the jury from the start. According to Ron Janes,
Ventura chief deputy district attorney, "[i]t's no secret the defense
attorneys, in their training, are taught to hang up juries."2' Grego-
ry Totten, executive director of the California District Attorney's
Association, feels that "oftentimes, defense attorneys approach trials
seeking to hang cases, not necessarily seeking acquittals."'
Defense counsel manipulation arguably begins during voir dire
with some lawyers searching for one or two partial jurors most likely
to hang the jury.' After impaneling the jury, defense lawyers
begin the process of manipulation and pandering, focusing attention
on those jurors who appear vulnerable and perhaps predisposed
toward the defendant.' Charles Calderon, author of S.C.A. 24,
claims that the problem with jury trials is "the emergence of designer
defenses which often attempt to rationalize murder and mayhem
through psychological quackery."'
Another tactic defense lawyers utilize is shifting the jury's
attention away from the crime, trying instead to put some other
person or institution on trial.Y While in some cases it is necessary
218. Bray, supra note 170, at B8.
219. The questions that linger post-Simpson concern the role race played in the
outcome and whether Johnny Cochran intentionally "played the race card" in order to
influence an African-American majority jury.
220. One can imagine a rape trial where defense counsel attempts to put the victim's
promiscuity into question. How was the victim dressed? Didn't the victim's actions incite
the defendant's conduct?
221. Juries are not immune to prejudices against homosexuals. In one case two men
had been accused of committing a sex act in a bathroom. The majority of the jury wanted
to acquit "but one woman refused to budge, making derogatory comments about gays."
Dolan, supra note 2, at Al, A23. The jury ultimately hung. l
222. Bray, supra note 170, at B8. Whether the legal profession condones these
practices is the source of debate; commentators note that some law school courses and
practitioners seminars instruct defense attorneys in the use of these manipulative tactics.
Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
223. Gonzales, supra note 5, at 1A.
224. Linda Walters, Overturn System of Unanimous Jury, L.A. TIMES (Orange County
ed.), June 22, 1995, at Bl (stating that "the defense rarely tries to select 12 impartial,
reasonable people. Rather, they search for the one or two unreasonable or biased
individuals to obstruct a unanimous verdict.").
225. Md
226. Calderon, supra note 9, at 10A.
227. Dolan, supra note 2, at A22. It has been argued that the Simpson trial turned,
perhaps unrightfully, into a trial of the Los Angeles Police Department. Jeff Brazil &
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for the defense attorney to explore other avenues of inquiry, the
practice of intentionally clouding the issues to confuse lay jurors is
unconscionable. Many cases are difficult to begin with and complex
evidence, confusing substantive rules, and expert testimony make the
juror's job even more difficult.' Defense attorneys are required to
expose holes in the prima facie case but, often, the practice creates
holes where none existed.
b. reducing the hung jury rate in California will result in a
reduction in economic and judicial costs
In some jurisdictions, the costs of retrial approach $10,000 a day,
and depending on the case, the total costs can be astronomical.'
These costs are exactly what the authors of the proposed constitution-
al amendments are targeting. A.C.A. 18 lists as one of its potential
effects "[the reduction of] court costs and court congestion due to re-
trials."' 30 S.C.A. 24 notes that "[o]ne of the stated purposes behind
this bill is to cut court costs by cutting out retrial of cases that return
a 11/12 verdict."'"
As discussed previously, there is reason to believe that the
unanimity requirement influences hung jury rates and may even
increase them. 2  Since hung juries result in costly retrials, logic
suggests that the unanimity requirement is also responsible for
increased economic and judicial costs. 3  Therefore, elimination of
the unanimity requirement will decrease hung jury rates, ultimately
reducing court costs and freeing judicial resources.'
James Rainey, LAPD Was on Tria4 Say Angry Officers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A8.
228. Meyer, Vanguard, supra note 207, at A12; Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
229. Bray, supra note 170, at B8. For example, a defendant in an Orange County
homicide case is currently awaiting his third trial after the first two juries hung. Walters,
supra note 224, at Bl. The cost thus far is approximately $1.4 million. Id.
230. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 2.
231. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 4.
232. REID HASTiE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 32 (1983). Reid Hastie is a professor in
the Department of Psychology at the University of Colorado.
233. Bill Billiter, Council Endorses Idea of 11-1 Jury Verdicts, L.A. TIMEs (Orange
County ed.), July 1, 1995, at B3. California senator Charles Calderon, who put forth this
argument, believes that "the criminal justice system has been plagued by an unnecessarily
high rate of hung juries, which has crippled our prosecutorial abilities and substantially
decreased local revenues because of the high cost of longer jury sequestration and
retrials." Id.
234. Id. at B3; Unanimous Juries Work-Let's Not Change the Rule, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
26, 1995, at B8 [hereinafter Unanimous Juries Work].
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In addition to the savings resulting from reduced hung jury rates,
supporters of the nonunanimous verdict contend that eliminating the
unanimity rule will reduce the number of first trials, 5 further
streamlining economic and judicial costs."36 The rationale behind
this argument is that some defendants and their attorneys demand
jury trials even though they are aware that the evidence against them
is sufficient to convict. 7 Such defendants hope they will be fortu-
nate enough to get one juror who will hang the entire panel."' A
defendant who is clearly guilty might gamble on a trial rather than
plea bargain with the prosecutor. 9
Supporters of the proposed constitutional amendment are also
looking toward the future impact of California's "Three Strikes"
law,2" which is likely to increase jury trials.24' Due to the harsh
sentences imposed by the new initiative, "defendants will have less
incentive to strike plea bargains and more incentive to go to a jury
trial."' 42 If the unanimity requirement results in more hung juries,
the number will increase in proportion to the rise in jury trials due to
the Three Strikes law.243  The net effect: an increase in costly,
time-consuming retrials.'
3. Critics of nonunanimous verdicts assume that jurors do not air
and weigh all issues when a majority verdict is permitted
One of the fundamental justifications of the unanimity require-
ment is that it forces jurors to critically consider the issues and spend
time deliberating with each other.45 The absence of a unanimous
235. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 8; see also Ainsworth, Measure Blocked, supra note
21, at 4 (noting that prosecutors contend that a 10-2 system would persuade defense
attorneys to plead their clients guilty as opposed to risking a trial).
236. Ainsworth, Measure Blocked, supra note 21, at 4.
237. Bray, supra note 170, at B8.
238. Id.
239. d
240. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1996). The initiative doubles the
sentence for anyone convicted of a second serious or violent felony, including burglary,
and mandates a 25-year-to-life sentence for a third felony.
241. Ainsworth, Ten, supra note 165, at 6; Holding, supra note 24, at 1. For a general
discussion of the "Three Strikes" law, see Victor S. Sze, Comment, A Tale of Three Strikes:
Slogan Triumphs Over Substance as Our Bumper-Sticker Mentality Comes Home to Roost,
28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
242. Ainsworth, Ten, supra note 165, at 6.
243. See id
244. See id.
245. Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8 ("Requiring unanimity is the best
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verdict presumably indicates that the jury has not deliberated
effectively and that the resulting verdict is in some way flawed.
2 6
This argument is often tied up in the "reasonable doubt stan-
dard." 7
The issue is whether the majority will hear the minority voices on
a 10-2 or 11-1 verdict and whether a verdict rendered by less than all
of the panel members gives substance to the reasonable doubt stan-
dard.2' The Supreme Court has addressed both of these concerns.
In Johnson v. Louisiana24 9 the Court decided that "want of unanimi-
ty does not alone establish reasonable doubt.""0 Just because one
or two jurors do not side with the majority is no reason to
"denigrat[e] the vote of so large a majority or ... refuse to accept
their decision as being, at least in their minds, beyond a reasonable
doubt."'" For this very reason judges facing a hung jury will issue
the infamous "dynamite" 2 charge which states:
[I]f much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting
juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds of so many
men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If,
upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the
minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was
not concurred in by the majority.'3
way to ensure that all jurors listen carefully to the evidence as it is given during the trial
and to one another during deliberations.").
246. Fein, supra note 36, at B9; Gonzales, supra note 5, at 1A.
247. See infra notes 248-54 and accompanying text. In all criminal cases the standard
for conviction, as provided by the 14th Amendment, is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
248. The defendants in both Apodaca and Johnson argued that in order to give
substance to the reasonable doubt standard provided by the Due Process Clause, the
clause must be construed to require a unanimous verdict in criminal trials. See Unanimous
Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8 (stating that "[a]llowing the majority of jurors to
disregard the views of a minority could ... undermine the historical obligation to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt").
249. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
250. Id. at 363.
251. Id. at 361.
252. Dolan, supra note 2, at A23.
253. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that a verdict reached by
ten or eleven of twelve jurors satisfies the reasonable doubt standard
and represents a fair and constitutional adjudication.p
The Court has also addressed the concern that permitting
majority verdicts allows the majority to ignore the minority voice."
In Apodaca v. Oregon the Court stated that
[w]e cannot assume that the majority of the jury will refuse
to weigh the evidence and reach a decision upon rational
grounds ... or that a majority will deprive a man of his
liberty on the basis of prejudice when a minority is present-
ing a reasonable argument in favor of acquittal. 6
Since the minority voices are present during the deliberation process,
they are heard and more than likely are taken into account.27
4. The unanimity requirement engenders
compromise convictions
When only ten or eleven jurors agree on acquittal or conviction,
the jury finds itself in a difficult position" 8 Because one or two
jurors will not agree with the majority vote, the entire panel may fail
to reach any sort of decision." If the defendant faces charges of
murder or some other serious offense, the majority confronts the
possibility that because the minority juror will not side with them, the
defendant, who appears to be guilty and potentially poses a threat to
society, may go free.2 On the other hand, if the defendant appears
to be entirely innocent, one or two, stubborn jurors may prevent that
defendant from going free.26'
True, a hung jury may result in a retrial, but the jury, who has
heard the case and strongly believes that the defendant is guilty, may
not want to risk a future acquittal. One option is to attempt to reach
a compromise with the minority jurors.26 For example, a jury might
convict for manslaughter rather than first degree murder.2' 6 Such
254. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362-63; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411.
255. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412-14.
256. L at 413.
257. Id.
258. See Dolan, supra note 2, at Al.
259. Id. at A23.
260. Id.
261. Id
262. ABRAMSON, supra note 38, at 203-04.
263. Id at 203 (noting that in the first Menendez trials, some jurors revealed that "they
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bargaining, however, fosters the feeling that justice was not
served. The probably guilty defendant received a lesser punish-
ment, not because the conduct was less culpable, but because of the
state's stubborn adherence to the unanimity requirement.
Any decision resulting from compromise rather than careful and
intelligent deliberation of the facts based on the applicable laws is
inherently suspect. Unfortunately, the requirement that juries reach
a unanimous verdict may lead "not to full agreement among. the 12
but to agreement by none and compromise by all, despite the
frequent absence of a rational basis for such compromise.?"
B. Arguments in Favor of the Unanimity Requirement
Taken together, the justifications for eliminating the unanimity
requirement are persuasive. The basic argument is that California's
obvious problem with hung juries is taking an excessive financial
toll.' A major cause of the problem is the constitutional require-
ment of unanimous verdicts in criminal trials. The solution is to
simply amend the state constitution.267 Such an amendment would
not violate federal Due Process, as the Supreme Court has condoned
majority verdicts in state criminal trials."
Despite the appeal of this argument, California should continue
its adherence to the unanimity requirement. While the critics are
correct that mere historical acceptance of the rule does not provide
enough justification for continued adherence, that California has
provided for a unanimous verdict requirement since its passage into
statehood lends some credibility to the requirement.269
Similarly, the fact that only two states have abandoned the
requirement offers further validation of the requirement's sound-
ness."0 If the rule is responsible for hung juries and excessive
financial costs, then why have only two states amended their
had considered a compromise verdict between those voting manslaughter and those
favoring murder conviction").
264. Dolan, supra note 2, at Al.
265. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 377 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
266. See supra part IV.A.2.b.
267. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 1-2; S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3.
268. See supra part II.B.
269. See supra part II.A. (discussing the history of the unanimity requirement in Cali-
fornia).
270. In the United States only Oregon and Louisiana provide for less than unanimous
verdicts. See supra note 33.
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constitutions to provide for majority verdicts? Furthermore, why has
the majority of the United States regarded the unanimity requirement
as a fundamental feature of a trial by jury for over 400 years? 27'
1. The unanimity requirement is a defendant's necessary
protection against the state
When a proposed constitutional amendment is on the table, it is
necessary to ask whether the change can occur without frustrating the
purpose of the system being altered. In this particular case can the
jury system achieve its purpose without the unanimity requirement?
The Court has stated that one of the fundamental reasons for
having the jury system is to provide the defendant with a "safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the com-
pliant, biased, or eccentric judge."'  One of the essential features
of the jury system is that it represents "the interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility
that results from that group's determination of guilt or inno-
cence."
273
Elimination of the unanimity requirement frustrates this purpose
in a number of ways. The proposed amendment eases the prosecuto-
rial burden in a criminal trial.274 Rather than having to convince all
twelve jurors of the defendant's guilt, the prosecutor can be victorious
despite the continued doubt of one or two jurors. While proponents
of constitutional change argue that invalid motivations often guide
minority jurors,27 evidence suggests that at times, minority jurors
actually have a valid point.276
A study conducted by the Los Angeles Public Defender's Office
from July 1, 1994 to June 7, 1995 found that of thirty-two trials which
hung for the first time by an 11-1 count in favor of guilt, four were
dismissed and twelve were retried.2' Of those twelve, five were
found to be not guilty and one more was subsequently dismissed.278
271. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3.
272. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156, reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
273. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
274. Bray, supra note 170, at B8 ("Defense attorneys... say non-unanimous verdicts
would simply result in more juries rubber-stamping prosecutors' cases.").
275. See supra part IV.A.2.a.i.
276. See Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3; Fein, supra note 36, at B9.
277. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 5.
278. Id.
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If either of the proposed constitutional amendments had been in
effect, these ten defendants would have been convicted279 and de-
prived of their liberty. These cases demonstrate that the one juror
who voted to acquit was not such an anomaly after all, since either
the prosecutor or twelve jurors subsequently agreed with the lone
dissenter in the first trial. Perhaps the eleven members of the first
trial who voted to convict were in error.
Is any change which threatens to put innocent people in jail
worth the projected benefits? Arguably, it is better to have a
hundred juries hang than to wrongfully convict one innocent citi-
zen. The more we erode the protections of the defendant the
more likely it is that innocent citizens face convictions for crimes they
did not commit."' Elimination of the unanimity requirement clearly
frustrates one of the purposes of the jury system-protection of the
defendant from tyranny by the state.' For this reason alone, Cali-
fornians should question the wisdom of the proposed constitutional
amendments.
2. The hung jury is not necessarily
a negative creature
Authors and supporters of the proposed amendments cast the
hung jury in negative terms, deeming it an evil must be eradicat-
ed.' For these critics, the hung jury represents a breakdown of the
jury system. The criminal justice system failed to convict the guilty
or acquit the innocent and the net result is a waste of economic and
judicial resources.
The idea that a hung jury automatically represents a failure of the
system, though, is misleading.' If after hearing the case and
conscientiously deliberating among themselves a jury cannot unani-
mously agree on a verdict, perhaps the case was just not persua-
sive. The prosecutor failed to carry the burden of proof even if
the jury was not completely convinced that the defendant was
blameless. In this light, a hung jury represents a victory on the part
279. Id.
280. Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3.
281. See id.; Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
282. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56.
283. See HASTiE ET AL., supra note 232, at 165-66.
284. Id.
285. See Blum, supra note 9, at A25; Meyers, Reformers, supra note 23, at A12;
Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
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of the jury system. 6 Rather than reach a compromise decision or
simply yield to the majority opinion, the members of a hung jury had
the courage to disagree with each other.
That a hung jury represents a victory for the jury system was best
stated in Huffman v. United States:'
It is simply not legally correct that some jury must sometime
decide that the defendant is "guilty" or "not guilty." The
fact is, as history reminds us, a succession of juries may
legitimately fail to agree until, at long last, the prosecution
gives up. But such juries, perhaps more courageous than
any other, have performed their useful, vital function in our
system. This is the kind of independence which should be
encouraged. It is in this independence that liberty is
secured.m
3. Elimination of the unanimity requirement will not substantially
alter hung jury rates or conviction rates
The most frequently advanced justification for the proposed
constitutional amendment is that California has a serious problem
with hung juries and something must be done immediately to solve
it.' While this argument is tempting, two major assumptions made
by proponents of the proposed amendments lack evidentiary support
and appear to be driven by faulty perceptions. First, proponents
estimate that the hung jury rate is a problem of massive propor-
tion29 and second, they rationalize that the proposed constitutional
amendment will substantially affect hung jury and conviction
rates.29' Both of these assumptions demand scrutiny because
available evidence suggests that both are invalid.
286. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 232, at 165-66. Professor Hastie notes that the hung
jury can be viewed as "a valued assurance of integrity" and signals that "antidefendant bias
was not present." Id.
287. 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962).
288. Id. at 759.
289. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 2; S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3.
290. A.C.A. 18, supra note 18, at 3.
291. See U; S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 3; Boyarsky, Balky Trial, supra note 143, at
A18.
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a. the hung jury rate in California is really not
as problematic as critics argue
While the hung jury rate in California is approximately ten
percent of all criminal jury trials, 2 "this is a very small percentage
of the criminal caseload. The overwhelming majority of criminal
cases-about 95%-never go to trial, but are dismissed or disposed
of by plea bargain."2 93  A survey conducted by the Los Angeles
Public Defender's Office (Public Defender Survey) from July 1, 1994
to June 7, 1995 found that hung juries constitute less than one percent
of all cases disposed of by the justice system each year.294
Turning to the alleged cost reductions which would result from
elimination of the hung jury requirement, the Public Defender survey
found that of thirty-two juries that hung for the first time from July
1, 1994 to June 7, 1995, only twelve resulted in retrial. The possible
cost savings had the proposed amendment been in place would only
amount to twelve retrials.
2 95
These figures beg the question of whether a constitutional
amendment is really necessary. Assuming that the hung jury is not
necessarily a negative entity, it would not be wise to tinker with a
provision which has been in place for over 145 years solely to save the
cost of twelve trials and deal with a problem that characterizes less
than one percent of all criminal cases disposed of by the justice
system each year.
b. the proposed constitutional amendment will not effect the change
that proponents claim it will
Authors and proponents of the proposed amendments believe
that permitting convictions or acquittals on a 10-2 or 11-1 vote will
somehow reduce the hung jury rate and restore the public's confi-
dence in the criminal justice system.296 This belief, however, rests
on the assumption that juries usually hang by one or two jurors.
292. Boyarsky, On Trial, supra note 148, at A17.
293. Id
294. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 5. In 1993-1994 the Los Angeles Public Defender's
Office handled a total of 307,241 misdemeanor and misdemeanor traffic cases. Id. Hung
juries accounted for only 0.3% of the total cases handled by the office. Id.
295. S.C.A. 24, supra note 19, at 5.
296. Id.
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Contrary to this assumption, however, evidence suggests that
most hung juries are more evenly divided. 97 The Public Defender
Survey found that most hung juries were divided 6-6, 7-5, 8-4, or 9-3,
and only a fraction of those cases resulted in convictions on retri-
al.z98 If it is true that most hung juries are hung 6-6, 7-5, 8-4, or 9-3,
then a constitutional amendment allowing convictions or acquittals by
a 10-2 or 11-1 vote will not accomplish those goals that it was
designed to accomplish.
Interestingly enough, the Chicago study" relied upon by the
Supreme Court and by proponents of the constitutional amendments
also provides evidence that eliminating the unanimity requirement will
not achieve the proponents' goals. Studying the development of the
voting situation from the first to the final ballot, the authors found
that "juries which begin with an overwhelming majority in either
direction are not likely to hang."3°° One conclusion that can be
drawn from this finding is that juries starting out with an 11-1, 10-2,
1-11, or 2-10 vote will usually end up convicting or acquitting. A
constitutional amendment will not really affect those cases which
appear to be clearcut to most of the jurors from the beginning.
Juries beginning with a minority of four or five jurors after the
first vote have an increased tendency to deadlock. The authors of the
study suggest, however, that "[i]f one take[s] the first ballot vote as a
measure of the ambiguity of the case, then it follows that the case
itself must be the primary cause of a hung jury."30' This conclusion
suggests that in many cases, it is not the one or two eccentric or
irrational jurors who hang the case; rather, the case itself raises
reasonable doubt.3" Perhaps the prosecutor did not present the
case well or there was not a viable case from the start. In either
event, an amendment to the California Constitution will not further
the goals of criminal justice. In a few cases it might erase the impact
of an occasional eccentric juror but overall, eliminating the unanimity
requirement is not the answer to the hung jury problem.
297. Kim Taylor-Thompson, Majority Rule on Juries Would Increase Errors, S.F.
CHRON., June 5, 1995, at A19; Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
298. Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
299. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
300. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 179, at 462.
301. Id at 462-63.
302. BIum, supra note 9, at A25; Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
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4. Deliberation suffers when nonunanimous
verdicts are permitted
The unanimity requirement forces jurors, minority and majority
alike, to listen to each other and try to reach a consensus vote.
3m
This process of deliberation is one of the hallmarks of the jury system,
and a constitutional amendment which allows jurors to reach a
majority verdict directly threatens the deliberation process.3 4 The
problem with allowing majority verdicts is that once the requisite
number of votes are obtained, the incentive to listen to the minority's
voices vanishes. 3°5 For all practical purposes, once the requisite
number are in agreement, the jury's job is done.
In an extensive study of jury decisionmaking, Reid Hastie
determined that allowing for majority verdicts negatively impacts the
deliberation process.2' First, Hastie found that jurors spent less
time deliberating when majority verdicts were allowed. °7 Once the
jury found that a majority had been obtained, deliberation stopped
shortly thereafter.as Second, "[n]onunanimous juries discuss both
evidence and law during deliberation far less thoroughly than do
unanimous rule juries.' '3' Third, overall satisfaction with delibera-
tion was higher among unanimous rule juries than majority rule
juries?1 Finally, "minority faction members participate with greater
303. ABRAMSON, supra note 38, at 205; Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3;
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 297, at A19.
304. ABRAMSON, supra note 38, at 205; Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3.
305. See ABRAMSON, supra note 38, at 199-200; Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36,
at 3; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 297, at A19; Steve Wilson, Hung Juries Preferable to
Those that Make Wrong Decision, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 1995, at A2.
Even England, which abolished the unanimity requirement in 1967, appears to be
aware of the potential problems associated with majority verdicts. In the English statute
allowing for majority verdicts, a court may not accept a verdict unless
it appears to the court that the jury have had such period of time for delibera-
tion as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity
of the case; and the Crown Court shall in any event not accept such a verdict
unless it appears to the court that the jury have had at least two hours for
deliberation.
Juries Act, 1974, ch. 23, § 17 (Eng.). This section may reflect a concern that jurors will not
deliberate long enough if permitted to return a less than unanimous verdict.
306. HASTE Er AL., supra note 232, at 227-29.
307. Id. at 32.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 228.
310. Id. at 32.
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frequency and are perceived as more influential in unanimous as
compared to majority rule juries.
311
Hastie's study suggests that requiring unanimity enhances the
deliberation process. 312 Jurors take more time to reach a decision
and appear to do a more thorough job.3u Members of the minority
factions within the jury play a more active and effective role in the
deliberation process and they feel satisfied that their voices were
heard.1 4
Thwarting the jury's deliberation may affect the defendant's
chances at a fair trial as well. It is important to note that in one of
every ten cases, the minority opinion successfully wins the majority
members over to its viewpoint. 5 If majority verdicts are permissi-
ble, the wisdom and insight driving the minority viewpoint may not
be heard.316
5. Nonunanimous verdicts may also be the
result of jury compromising
While opponents of the unanimity requirement assert that the
rule engenders compromise on the part of jurors intent on "getting it
over with," nonunanimous jury verdicts may also result from
compromise. A jury hung 9-3, 8-4, 7-5, or 6-6 on a murder case
tempts the majority to suggest a reduction to manslaughter to
convince two or three minority jurors to abandon their position in
order to satisfy the majority verdict requirement. The argument that
the unanimity requirement must be abolished to prevent compromised
verdicts is invalid since compromise potentially marks all trials to
some degree, whether unanimity is required or not.
311. 1&
312. Id. at 227-30.
313. I& at 228.
314. Id. at 32.
315. Fein, supra note 36, at B9. This type of scenario is reminiscent of the classic
Hollywood movie, 12 Angry Men, where one courageous juror stood up to his 11 fellow
panelists and convinced them that the defendant was innocent. 12 ANGRY MEN (United
Artists 1957).
316. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 232, at 29 ("[I]n majority rule juries ... minority
faction members were especially likely to believe that they had not had opportunity to
express all their arguments concerning the case.").
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6. Nonunanimous verdicts threaten the credibility
of the criminal justice system
To a certain extent, our confidence in the justice system is rooted
in the presumption of innocence? 7 It is based on the belief that
"the government won't abuse its power and wrongly convict people
who aren't guilty. 318  To maintain confidence in the system, the
public must believe that the burden of proof is more than a simple
formality easily overcome by the state. Allowing nonunanimous
verdicts makes the prosecutor's job easier and a conviction no longer
seems to be pure justice. The nonunanimous conviction represents a
compromising of the defendant's presumed innocence.
319
A constitutional amendment that eliminates the unanimity
requirement threatens to denigrate the jury system in the eyes of the
public. Unanimous jury verdicts enhance the credibility of the jury
system because they appear to represent the rational and reasoned
judgment of all twelve jurors.3 ' When all of the panelists agree to
convict or acquit the defendant, the public feels that the jurors fully
deliberated the case and that the resulting verdict is just.
32'
The absence of unanimity, however, may not engender the same
confidence in the results. The public wonders whether the defendant
has been proven guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" if one or two
jurors were not convinced. 3' Although the Supreme Court has
ruled that the absence of unanimity is not by itself enough to
constitute reasonable doubt,3n the idea that twelve jurors, deemed
impartial by both sides, cannot unanimously agree throws the
prosecutor's case into doubt. Will the public embrace a system in
which the prosecutor can put a defendant in jail for years despite the
continued doubts of one or two jurors?
317. Wilson, supra note 303, at A2.
318. Itd
319. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 392-93 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Ainsworth, Ten, supra note 165, at 1 ("[Law enforcement groups] will not stop until the
system is totally rigged against the defendant .... [t]hey are not interested in the notion
that a defendant is presumed innocent." (quoting Jeff Brown, San Francisco public
defender)).
320. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 297, at A19.
321. ABRAMSON, supra note 38, at 203.
322. Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
323. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 363-64 (1972).
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7. Constitutional change should not result
from high-publicity trials
The current push for a constitutional amendment has gained
much of its momentum from the recent spate of high-publicity trials
with results that leave the public wondering whether justice was
served. The first Menendez trials ended in hung juries even though
the brothers confessed to killing their parents? 4 The two officers
who beat Rodney King were initially acquitted despite recorded
footage of the brutal beating.3' And now, 0.J. Simpson has been
acquitted despite evidence pointing to his guilt."
In many of these trials, the public has had a front row seat in the
courtroom, and the never-ending commentary by attorneys and
newscasters alike has turned ordinary laypersons into armchair
attorneys. More important to the unanimity debate, the public has
been assaulted with a series of one-sided criticisms of the jury system,
complete with recipes for reform. If the people are called upon to
vote for the constitutional amendment, there is a very real possibility
that many of them will vote to amend California's Constitution to
allow nonunanimous verdicts. Frustration is high and proponents of
the proposed amendment are using this public distrust to fuel their
campaign.
32
Despite the questionable results in these high-profile trials, the
jury system is still a viable institution which serves a vital function.
In most cases, jurors fulfill their civic responsibility and render just
results based upon the applicable law and fact. Just as Governor
Wilson's ten percent hung jury figure can be used to indict the system,
it can also be used to demonstrate its effectiveness. After all, if ten
percent of California criminal jury trials hang, ninety percent end in
unanimous verdicts.
324. Unanimous Juries Work, supra note 234, at B8.
325. Dolan, supra note 2, at A22.
326. Newton, Not Guilty, supra note 12, at Al, A8. This case has spawned some heated
rhetoric. Five months before the verdict was returned, District Attorney Gil Garcetti told
the L.A. Times, "[People] want a certain level of competence and security, that we are
convicting those who should be held accountable. But is the reasonable doubt standard
and definition consistent with that desire?" Boyarsky, Shake-Up, supra note 13, at B4.
When asked whether we should change the standard, Garcetti said, "Yes." Id.
327. Calderon, supra note 9, at 10A; Holding, supra note 24, at 10; Tanzer, supra note
50, at B9.
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The trials of defendants such as the Menendez brothers and O.J.
Simpson are not representative of the manner in which the criminal
justice system disposes of cases. 3's These cases are unique in almost
every respect, including the amount of media coverage they have
received and the amount of money that defendants have spent to
prepare their defenses.329 Since these cases are in large part "anom-
alous," the question is whether they should be the vehicles for driving
reform. Supporters of the unanimity requirement and this Author
feel that they are not appropriate springboards for change, especially
constitutional amendment.
a. media saturation of high publicity trials gives the public a
distorted picture of the manner in which justice operates
Not every criminal defendant can afford to hire a "dream
team"33 and not every criminal trial becomes the center of public
fascination. High-profile trials are special in that the public becomes
involved in every facet of the case, from the trial proceedings to the
personal lives of the attorneys.33' Due to the advent of cameras in
the courtroom, the public can watch the entire proceeding, including
color commentary by television anchors and live interviews with
attorneys before and after each day's events.332
With increased public interest in the actual proceedings comes
increased access to evidence which is clearly inadmissible in the legal
proceedings. Media sources often exercise poor judgement and poor
taste when presenting information concerning trials.333 What critics
328. Fred Goldman, supra note 26, at B1 (" 'The Simpson trial was in no way typical
of how the criminal justice system operates on a daily basis.'" (quoting Cristina Arguedas,
president-elect of the defense attorneys' group)); Necessity of Change, supra note 8, at S7
(" 'What is particularly troubling is that such proposals are triggered by a trial that is a
complete aberration from how our system usually functions.'" (quoting Peter Arenella,
UCLA law professor)).
329. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Celebrity Case Is the Wrong Inspiration for Reform, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1995, at B9 [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Wrong Inspiration]; Weinstein &
Rutten, supra note 188, at A34.
330. This was the nickname given to the defense team assembled by O.J. Simpson in
his murder trial. See Steven Nissen, Should Congress Pull the Plug on the Legal Services
Corp?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at B9.
331. See David Shaw, Did the Media Overfeed a Starving Public?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1995, at Sl; Henry Weinstein, Experts See Legal Problems in a Media Ban, L.A. TIMEs,
Sept. 24, 1995, at A3 (noting that "[t]here are now cameras in courtrooms in virtually
every state, including California").
332. Shaw, supra note 331, at S11.
333. Chemerinsky, Wrong Inspiration, supra note 329, at B9.
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of the jury system fail to point out to the public is that jurors do not
get to read the papers or the tabloids, and they are not privy to
potentially damaging evidence.3
When we consider that jurors in high-profile cases do not have
the same access to information that the ordinary layperson has, the
"questionableness" of their decisions begins to disappear. The jury's
role is to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the defendant based on
the evidence presented in court. Any criticism of jury verdicts that
fails to take into account the difference between the information that
the public has access to and that the jury actually heard should be
viewed with extreme caution.
Legislators who propose constitutional amendments in response
to anomalous cases have an increased responsibility to explain how
these changes are likely to impact the majority of cases-those which
do not receive Simpson-like publicity.
b. the proposed constitutional amendments will have
a disproportionate impact on the poor
When legislators and lobbyists propose constitutional change in
response to high-profile trials, there is a tendency to frame the
problem in terms of one or two high-profile cases while ignoring the
rest of the system. For example, the first Menendez trials involved
two brothers who were able to expend millions of dollars to prepare
their defense. When the juries hung in both trials, critics of the jury
system pointed to the Menendez trials and called for elimination of
the unanimity requirement, arguing that it was unrealistic for the
prosecutor to get all twelve jurors to agree.335
The consequence of such a change would be that prosecutors may
have an easier time convicting defendants like the Menendez brothers
who have millions of dollars at their disposal. However, nobody
considers what will happen to the majority of defendants, those who
cannot afford the type of defense that the Menendez brothers
presented.336 Attorneys assigned to represent indigent defendants
334. Gerald F. Uelman, Did the jury system fail in the Simpson trial?, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Oct. 14, 1995, at B7. The Simpson case is quite illustrative of this point. For
example, the jury did not get to hear the entire tape-recorded interview of Mark Fuhrman
or the tearful accusations of Ronald Goldman's father. Id. Both of these excerpts were
partly responsible for shaping public opinion about the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id.
335. Tanzer, suprd note 50, at B9.
336. For a general discussion of the problems associated with counsel for indigent
defendants, see Meyer, Vanguard, supra note 207, at A12.
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have few resources to wage a defense.3" A constitutional change
making the prosecutor's job easier will make the defense attorney's
job more difficult.
Elimination of the unanimity requirement will have a dispropor-
tionate impact on the poor even if it happens to prevent an occasional
Menendez-type situation in the future.38 Since the majority of cases
are unlike high-profile cases, a constitutional change is not an appro-
priate measure to take.339
8. Other ways to improve the jury system exist
Amending the California Constitution is a serious undertaking.
The amendment process is extremely difficult to satisfy and the
resulting change, unlike a legislative enactment, carries with it a
certain sense of finality. Arguably such a change should be reserved
for only the most compelling situations when every other avenue of
improvement has been exhausted.' In the case of jury unanimity,
there remain other means by which we can improve the jury system.
One of the arguments against the unanimity requirement is that
often individual jurors arrive at "questionable decisions" because they
do not understand the judge's instructions.341 Perhaps a better
solution than constitutional change is to rewrite the instructions that
judges give to juries so they are more comprehensible to the
layperson.34 If juries hang because of juror ignorance, we should
focus on eliminating the ignorance as opposed to eliminating a
defendant's constitutional safeguard.
In addition to making legal instructions more accessible, allowing
jurors to ask questions and take notes during all criminal proceedings
may lead to more informed decisionmaking.343 Surely these are
measures that may substantially improve the jury system without
337. Weinstein & Rutten, supra note 188, at A34. In Alabama, for example, attorneys
appointed to represent indigents in capital cases receive just $1000 to prepare the entire
case while the DNA experts alone in the Simpson case cost up to $50,000 a week. Id.
Bryan Stevenson, director of the Capital Representation Center in Alabama, claims that
several capital cases involve "one paragraph closing arguments" by defense counsel. Id.
338. Id.
339. See Chemerinsky, Wrong Inspiration, supra note 329, at B9; Taylor-Thompson,
supra note 297, at A19; Wilson, supra note 305, at A2.
340. Chemerinsky, Nixing, supra note 36, at 3.
341. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
342. Hirsch, supra note 188, at A23; Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
343. Hirsch, supra note 188, at A23; Strier, supra note 203, at B7.
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having to resort to the extreme measure of changing the California
Constitution.
V. EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS: IT Is BETTER TO
ERR ON THE SIDE OF THE DEFENDANT
The U.S. Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a trial by
an impartial jury. While the Supreme Court has ruled that a jury
verdict in a federal trial must be unanimous, the states may determine
for themselves whether to read a unanimous verdict requirement into
their own constitutions. For over 145 years California has chosen to
require a unanimous jury decision to convict a defendant. This
decision reflects California's historical commitment to protecting the
defendant from tyranny by the state.
The current proposals for constitutional change are based on the
notion that the current jury system is not working properly and that
in order to fix the problem, California must eliminate the unanimity
requirement. Nonunanimous verdicts will decrease California's hung
jury rate, convict more defendants at the first trial, and restore the
public's confidence in the system.
Despite the temptation to embrace this rationale, the evidence
posited by proponents of the amendment simply does not support the
contention that elimination of the unanimity requirement will really
solve the problems of the criminal justice system. Although Califor-
nia does have a hung jury rate of approximately ten percent, this
figure represents only a small number of cases handled by the system,
and it is unclear whether allowing for 10-2 or 11-1 verdicts will really
increase the number of convictions or acquittals.
When asked to substantiate their claims that the unanimity
requirement is to blame for the system's problems, critics point to the
Menendez trial, the O.J. Simpson trial, and the Rodney King trial.
These cases are simply not representative of the criminal justice
system and "it would be utter folly to initiate any fundamental reform
of the system based on a single case, or any small group of notorious
cases .. . which are representative of almost nothing except excess
and bad taste."3"
Even if we concede that elimination of the unanimity require-
ment will decrease hung jury rates and save some economic and
judicial costs, the risks involved in decreasing the systemic protections
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of the defendant outweigh the benefits. Nonunanimous verdicts ease
the prosecution's burden and upset jury deliberation, a hallmark of
the jury system in this country for hundreds of years. If only ten or
eleven jurors are required to secure a verdict, it is not likely that once
that number is reached the members of the majority will bother to
hear the arguments of the dissenters.
It is true that the jury system is imperfect and there are clearly
areas which must be addressed in the near future. The fundamental
disagreement concerns how to implement change and improvement.
A constitutional amendment is simply not the appropriate means of
attacking the jury system problems, especially when the evidence
supporting the change is thin and the proponents of the change are
using an anomalous high-profile trial to fuel the movement.
How fitting it was that the O.J. Simpson trial ended in a
unanimous acquittal. So many critics of the jury system predicted a
hung jury, but the Simpson jury sent the message that "'juries can
reach unanimous decisions, even in cases that involve hot-button
social issues, whether it's spousal abuse, police misconduct, or
race-based discrimination.' ,345
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the constitutionality of the proposed amendments to the
California Constitution, the arguments for their adoption do not
overcome the potential injustices that they may encourage. The jury
system has long been regarded as one of the defining features of our
system of democracy. When the state acts in a manner which neuters
the jury system, the entire criminal justice system is put in jeopardy.
The unanimity requirement serves an important function in jury
trials. Requiring all twelve members of the jury to reach a consensus
encourages deliberation and assures consideration of both majority
and minority viewpoints prior to rendering a decision. By eliminating
the unanimity requirement, the jury is less likely to adequately
deliberate issues and the majority may overpower the minority voice.
In a system that presumes the defendant innocent until proven
guilty, any error must fall on the side of protecting the accused. The
state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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defendant is guilty and any law which eases this burden threatens the
integrity of the system.
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